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INTRODUCTION

In National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius1
("NFIB"), the Supreme Court maintained both its jurisdiction
over the case and the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act2
(ACA) by threading the needle between the Anti-Injunction Acts
(AIA) and Congress's taxing power under the Constitution.4 The
legal implications of the majority opinion, however, have yet to
work themselves out in the field of tax law. The AIA and the Tax
Injunction Acts (TIA) protect federal and state taxes, respectively,
from precollection injunctions in federal court. In other words, litigants must pay first and then challenge the taxes in court. Because the text of each act mentions only "taxes," courts have interpreted the acts to mean that they do not protect other
government charges. This means that courts must determine
when a government charge is a "tax" and when it is something
else. The main alternatives are "regulatory fees" (or simply "fees")
and "penalties," and the problems of delineating these categories
are the subject of Part II. In short, taxes are seen as being imposed broadly for the purpose of general revenue while penalties
and fees are imposed more narrowly to incentivize certain behaviors or defray costs arising from regulations. Historically, courts

t BA 2014, Hillsdale College; MSc 2015, University of Oxford; JD Candidate 2018,
The University of Chicago Law School.
1 567 US 519 (2012) ("NFIB").
2
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010).
3 Act of Mar 2, 1867 § 10, 14 Stat 471, 475; Internal Revenue Code of 1954 § 7421,
68A Stat 1, 876, codified at 26 USC § 7421. This statute is sometimes also referred to as
the Tax Anti-Injunction Act, but the majority of courts refer to it as the Anti-Injunction
Act. The AIA should not be confused with the statute of the same name, enacted as part
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 § 5, 1 Stat 333, 334-35, codified at 28 USC § 2283 (preventing
federal courts from issuing injunctions against ongoing proceedings in state courts).
4
See US Const Art I, § 8, cl 1 ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts and excises.").
5 50 Stat 738 (1937), codified at 28 USC § 1341.
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deciding cases under the TIA have tended to minimize the importance of the statutory label applied to a charge when deciding
how to categorize it,6 but the logic of NFIB in interpreting the AIA
turns on the fact that Congress labeled the "individual mandate"
a "penalty" rather than a "tax."7 The majority construed this language as evidence of a purposeful decision by Congress not to take
advantage of the protection against injunctions offered by its own
creation, the AIA.8

The application of NFIB to future cases under the AIA should
be straightforward: if Congress labels a charge a "penalty" or
"fee," then it is deemed to have intended that the AIA not protect
that charge. On the other hand, the logic of NFIB, in which a single legislative body excepts one of its laws from another of its own
laws, is one step removed from the TIA, which applies to laws
enacted by state legislatures. But just as Congress can control the
application of its own law, it can also give states the ability to
control the application of federal law by "incorporating" state
law.9 Despite the federal-state distinction between the AIA and
the TIA, the text and effects of the statutes are substantially identical, and cases that treat the definitions and applications of the
statutes are used as interchangeable precedent by default in current jurisprudence. Given this background, the logical extension
of the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB would be to look to a
state-law label to define a charge under the TIA. This Comment
argues that applying NFIB's label test to the TIA is justifiable,
based on the act's legislative history and the practice of using the
AIA in TIA cases, and beneficial, in that it offers a bright-line test
for determining when an exaction is a "tax" for purposes of the TIA.
Currently, courts use a variety of tests to separate taxes from
nontaxes. But federal courts struggle to make a consistent distinction, especially when faced with exactions that both raise revenue (like a tax) and penalize very specific behavior (like a penalty). For instance, circuits are split over whether "tax
delinquency penalties," applied to individuals who fail to pay
their taxes, should be categorized as taxes or penalties under the
TIA. But under NFIB, the state-law "penalty" label would be
dispositive. The simplicity of this new test saves litigants from
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See Part I.B.
See NFIB, 567 US at 543-46.
Id.
See note 142.
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current uncertainty and federal judges from navigating a growing
body of conflicted jurisprudence.
Part I of this Comment outlines the legislative history of the
AIA and TIA, as well as the Supreme Court's understanding of
their related legislative purposes. Part II reviews the current
inter- and intracircuit splits over how to tell when a government
charge is a "tax" protected under the TIA. Part III examines two
recent Supreme Court decisions, Direct Marketing Association v
Brohlo and NFIB, in order to evaluate possible solutions. While
the legislative history and purpose behind the TIA are important,
Brohl precludes a solution based on legislative purpose alone. On
the other hand, NFIB offers the possibility of a much simpler test.
Part III then offers an analysis of why this label test should be
transplanted from NFIB, an ALA case, into TIA jurisprudence.
I. BACKGROUND LAW AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

This Part introduces the parallel statutes of the AntiInjunction Act and Tax Injunction Act. Each statute protects federal and state taxes, respectively, from equitable interference by
federal courts. Of particular importance is the legislative history
behind the TIA, which documents a congressional concern for the
integrity of state budgets. The Supreme Court has also expressed
a concern about federal-court respect for the state-court system,
drawn from the text of the TIA, which states that federal intervention is allowed only if a "speedy and efficient remedy" is not
available in state court.
A.

The Anti-Injunction Act: Protecting Federal Taxes

Article III of the Constitution grants Congress the power to
create "inferior courts" in which to vest the judicial power of the
United States.11 Congress, in turn, has granted the district
courts original jurisdiction to hear cases arising under federal
law12 and cases with diverse parties.13 But what Congress has
given, Congress can take away.1 4 In 1867, Congress enacted the
Anti-Injunction Act, barring federal courts from interfering in
cases involving federal taxes before they are collected. The statute
10 135 S Ct 1124 (2015).
11 US Const Art III, § 1.
12 28 USC § 1331.
13 28 USC § 1332.
14 For discussion of the extent of such power, see generally
Richard H. Fallon Jr,
Jurisdiction-StrippingReconsidered, 96 Va L Rev 1043 (2010).
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mandates that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by
any person."15 In other words, the AIA institutes a timeline in
the
which taxpayers pay the tax first and then file suit to recover
16
cases.
AIA
money. Before then, federal courts cannot hear
Legislative history on the AIA is sparse, as the Supreme
Court has acknowledged: "The Anti-Injunction Act apparently
has no recorded legislative history."17 The text of the ALA was
18
adopted, without debate or comment, as an amendment proposed by Senator William Pitt Fessenden to the Revenue Act of
1866.19 While newspapers recorded the amendment's passage, no
reports of the Senate Finance Committee or Conference
Committee have ever been recovered, nor is there any mention in
the personal correspondence of Fessenden.20 On the other hand,
an 1895 treatise claimed that the amendment was a response to
applications for injunctions against the newly instituted income
tax. 21 Regardless of its lack of legislative history, the Supreme
Court has stated that "its language could scarcely be more explicit.

. .

. [T]he principal purpose of this language [is] the protec-

tion of the Government's need to assess and collect taxes as expeditiously as possible with a minimum of pre-enforcement judicial
interference."22

The Tax Injunction Act: Protecting State Taxes
In 1937, Congress passed a derivative statute to the AIA to
protect state tax revenues from federal injunctions. The wording
of the TIA was similar, but not identical, to the wording of the
AIA: "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the
assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a
plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of
B.

15 Act of Mar 2, 1867 § 10, 14 Stat at 475.
16 For a discussion of the jurisdictional nature of the TIA and AIA, see note 41.
17 Bob Jones University v Simon, 416 US 725, 736 (1974).
18 See id, citing Note, Enjoining the Assessment and Collection of Federal Taxes despite Statutory Prohibition,49 Harv L Rev 109, 109 & n 9 (1935).
19 Act of Mar 2, 1867 § 10, 14 Stat at 475, amending the Revenue Act of 1866 § 19,
14 Stat 98, 152.
20 Note, 49 Harv L Rev at 109 & n 9 (cited in note 17).
21 Roger Foster and Everett V. Abbot, A Treatise on the Federal Income Tax under
the Act of 1894 231 (1895) ("When the income tax was first imposed during the civil war,
a number of applications were made for injunctions against its assessment or collection.
To prevent this practice, Congress [passed the AIA].').
22 Bob Jones, 416 US at 736.
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such State."23 According to the conference report accompanying
the bill, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary was most concerned with stabilizing state and local government finances, especially in protracted diversity cases involving large foreign corporations. 24 The committee claimed that state and local
governments had been forced to settle suits for less than the
amount of tax owed, not because the lawsuits were strong but because the government entities needed the money. 25 The bill was
also envisioned as a way of equalizing the "highly unfair picture"
in which citizens of the state would have to "pay first and then
litigate," while diverse plaintiffs could withhold money until cases
were ended.26 The bill passed without controversy. 27
Various Supreme Court cases evaluating the scope of the TIA
have emphasized not only its text but its spirit and underlying
purpose, and the Court has even relied upon these extratextual
characterizations in its TIA jurisprudence. The Court has stated
that the text of the law "reflects a congressional concern to confine
federal-court intervention in state government."28 This congressional concern mirrors an equivalent judicial concern of respect
for state courts. When using the TIA to block a challenge to
Oklahoma taxes imposed on foreign-based motor carriers, the
Court stated, "We have long recognized that principles of federalism and comity generally counsel that courts should adopt a
hands-off approach with respect to state tax administration."29
The principle of "comity" is shorthand for the Supreme Court's
presumption in favor of state-court jurisdiction when faced with
a "conflict between the state's interest in having the issues adjudicated in a state forum and the individual's interest in a federal
forum."o The Court stressed that "the principle of comity

[]

23 TIA § 1, 50 Stat at 738, 28 USC § 1341.
24 Amending the Judicial Code, S Rep No 75-1035, 75th
Cong, 1st Sess 2 (1937).
25 Id ("The pressing needs of these States for this tax money
is so great that in many
instances they have been compelled to compromise these suits, as a result of which substantial portions of the tax have been lost.").
26 Id.
27 See S 1551, 75th Cong, 1st Sess, in 81 Cong Rec 8412 (Aug
6, 1937); S 1551 75th
Cong, 1st Sess, in 81 Cong Rec 9008 (Aug 16, 1937).
28 Arkansas v Farm Credit Services of CentralArkansas, 520
US 821, 826-27 (1997).
29 National Private Truck Council, Inc v Oklahoma Tax Commission,
515 US 582,
586 (1995).
30 Michael Wells, The Role of Comity in the Law of Federal Courts, 60 NC L Rev 59,
60 (1981).
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underlies [the TIA ."31 Furthermore, the Court has stated that it
expressly relied on this extratextual purpose of the TIA to inform
its decisions: "We subsequently relied upon the Act's spirit to extend the prohibition from injunctions to declaratory judgments
regarding the constitutionality of state taxes."32
C.

Litigation under the TIA

The Tax Injunction Act is relevant only for cases in which
plaintiffs are challenging a state or local tax in federal court.
First, plaintiffs would rely on a positive grant of federal jurisdiction to get into federal court. The vast majority of cases fall under
federal question jurisdiction,33 in which taxpayers claim that a
charge imposed on them violated some provision of the
Constitution,34 was preempted by federal law,35 or even violated
federal racketeering laws.36 If a plaintiff has not yet paid the tax,
then they would be seeking equitable relief in the form of an injunction or declaratory judgment. The TIA forbids federal courts
from dispensing such relief.37 If, however, the plaintiff can successfully argue that the state charge they are challenging is not a
tax, then the suit can proceed in federal court.
States may raise the TIA as a defense against a suit for an
injunction in federal court, but because the text of the TIA is addressed to the district courts ("The district courts shall not enjoin
."), it is also typically interpreted as a jurisdictional law.38

FranchiseTax Board of Californiav Alcan Aluminium Ltd, 493 US 331, 333 (1990)
784-85
(emphasis added). See also Blatchford v Native Village of Noatak, 501 US 775,
Co v
(1991) (holding that the TIA is a "matter of comity"); Burlington Northern Railroad
Oklahoma Tax Commission, 481 US 454, 464 (1987) ("These are policy considerations
which may have weighed heavily with legislators who considered the Act and its predecessors. It should go without saying that we are not free to reconsider them now."); Fair
Assessment in Real Estate Association, Inc v McNary, 454 US 100, 103 (1981) ('"This legislation, and the decisions of this Court which preceded it, reflect the fundamental principle
of comity between federal courts and state governments that is essential to 'Our Federalism,' particularly in the area of state taxation.").
32 NationalPrivate Truck, 515 US at 586 (emphasis added).
33 See 28 USC § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.").
34 See, for example, Kathrein v City of Evanston, 636 F3d 906, 910 (7th Cir 2011).
35 See, for example, Chamber of Commerce of the United States v Edmondson, 594

31

F3d 742, 750 (10th Cir 2010).
36 See, for example, Empress Casino Joliet Corp v Balmoral Racing Club, Inc, 651
F3d 722, 724-25 (7th Cir 2011) (en banc).
37 28 USC § 1341.
38 See Californiav Grace Brethren Church, 457 US 393, 417 n 38 (1982) (describing
the TIA as a "jurisdictional bar").
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Therefore, courts must "investigate the application of the Tax
Injunction Act regardless of whether the parties raise it as an issue."39 Nor is the TIA subject to waiver by the state. 40 That is, even
if a state were happy to allow a federal court to proceed to the
merits, the TIA would still bar the case. 41
II. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF CURRENT TIA JURISPRUDENCE

Circuit courts have long struggled with the problem of how to
handle the definition of "taxes" under the TIA, a complicated endeavor that produces inconsistent results. Part II.A presents the
leading cases and tests that courts have used to mark the boundaries of taxes and nontax charges. Many courts continue to apply
multifactor tests that attempt to capture various aspects of a
"classic tax." Judge Richard Posner, on the other hand, advocates
for a simpler test, objectively comparing the cost of the regulation
to the charge imposed. A third group of courts abandons any pretense of formal tests or facts, instead pursuing a more holistic inquiry into the legislative "purpose" behind the charge.
Penalties pose an especially difficult taxonomic problem, because they may raise general revenue but seem to have the main
purpose of regulating specific behavior. Part II.B presents the circuit split over tax delinquency penalties as an example of current
problems in TIA jurisprudence, in which similar laws are categorized in inconsistent ways.
A.

Circuit Courts Have Utilized a Variety of Tests to
Categorize Charges

Most of the cases in the following sections were decided in the
last twenty-five years, despite the fact that the TIA was enacted

Folio v City of Clarksburg, 134 F3d 1211, 1214 (4th Cir 1998).
Trailer Marine Transport Corp v Rivera Vazquez, 977 F2d 1, 5 (1st Cir 1992) ("If
this Court were nonetheless to reach the First Amendment issues presented in these appeals, the litigants would have sidestepped neatly Congress' intent and our longstanding
policy 'to limit drastically' federal interference in the administration of state taxes when
a 'plain, speedy and efficient' state remedy is available."), citing Grace Brethren Church,
457 US at 418-19.
41 For a more in-depth discussion of the jurisdictional nature of the TIA,
see generally Peter D. Enrich, Federal Courts and State Taxes: Some JurisdictionalIssues, with
Special Attention to the Tax Injunction Act, 65 Tax Law 731 (2012). According to conventional wisdom, the AIA is also jurisdictional in nature, despite not being addressed to the
district courts, but at least one scholar has argued that conventional wisdom is wrong. See
generally Erin Morrow Hawley, The EquitableAnti-Injunction Act, 90 Notre Dame L Rev
81 (2014).
39

40
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in 1937. Cases before the 1990s are fewer and further between.
As the following cases show, courts began to categorize government exactions as taxes or as regulatory fees or penalties after
the 1990s, leading to significant growth in the case law. Generally, courts agree that "taxes" are levied for the purpose of raising
general revenue. As such, courts experience difficulty when determining whether a government charge that only incidentally
raises revenue is a "tax."
1. Courts in early cases reduced the inquiry to a threefactor test.
An early, seminal case discussing the distinction between
taxes and nontaxes under the TIA is the First Circuit's 1992 decision in San Juan Cellular Telephone Co v Public Service
Commission of Puerto Rico,42 which sketched out the conceptual
relationship between taxes and fees. When the plaintiff telephone
company challenged a 3 percent charge on private telephone providers, the Puerto Rican government responded that the charge
was a tax and that an injunction was not allowed.4 In addition to
TIA precedent on the distinction between taxes and nontax
charges (of which there was relatively little at the time),44 the
court drew on a swath of public utilities cases. The distinction between taxes and nontaxes is important in the public utilities context because government agencies have the power to regulate
such utilities, which includes levying regulatory charges, but not
45
imposing taxes.
42 967 F2d 683 (1st Cir 1992). This case actually concerns the Butler Act, which is
Puerto Rico's version of the TIA, but courts continue to cite it as if it were a TIA case. See,
for example, Empress Casino, 651 F3d at 730; Bidart Brothers v California Apple
Commission, 73 F3d 925, 930 (9th Cir 1996).
43 San Juan Cellular, 967 F2d at 684-85.
44 The first circuit-court case to examine the distinction between taxes and fees under the TIA was Tramel v Schrader, 505 F2d 1310, 1316 (5th Cir 1975) (finding city streetimprovement assessments to be a "tax" falling under the TIA). For other circuit-court cases
decided before San Juan Cellular, see generally Miami Herald Publishing Co v City of
Hallandale, 734 F2d 666 (11th Cir 1984) (severing a city newspaper-licensing law's
revenue-raising components, which the TIA sheltered from federal-court challenge, from
its regulatory components in order to consider constitutional objections to the regulatory
provisions); Schneider Transport,Inc v Cattanach,657 F2d 128 (7th Cir 1981) (ruling that
state truck-registration fees represented taxes under the TIA rather than regulatory license fees); Robinson Protective Alarm Co v City of Philadelphia, 581 F2d 371 (3d Cir
1978) (holding that city collection of fees for the use of underground lines constituted a tax
triggering the TIA).
45 See John H. Ridge, Fees or Taxes: Rethinking the Bidart Test as Applied to TelecommunicationRight-of- Way Charges, 19 J Multistate Taxn & Incentives 30, 30 (Sept 2009).
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From the public utilities cases, the court imported a "spectrum" framework into the realm of the TIA, with "a paradigmatic
tax at one end and a paradigmatic fee at the other."46 According
to the court, "The classic 'tax' is imposed by a legislature upon
many, or all, citizens," and is "spent for the benefit of the entire
community."47 This definition of "tax" emphasizes broad incidence
and broad benefits. On the other hand, the court defined a "regulatory fee" as a charge imposed not by a legislature but by an individual agency on a narrower group of citizens, namely, "those
subject to its regulation."48 Such regulatory fees may be for "deliberately discouraging particular conduct by making it more expensive" or for defraying the cost of associated regulation, such as
when the Nuclear Regulatory Commission charges companies for
performing environmental reviews.49 Therefore, fees tend to be
imposed on a narrower subset of people, for a narrower purpose
than raising general revenue. Finally, the court noted that for
close cases in the middle of the spectrum, the focus of the taxonomic inquiry is on the ultimate use of the collected money,
whether it is used for a general benefit or simply for defraying the
cost of a regulation.o
In Bidart Brothers v California Apple Commission,51 the
Ninth Circuit attempted to reduce San Juan Cellularto a threefactor test.5 2 The court identified three factors to distinguish taxes
from fees: (1) the entity that levies the charge, (2) the parties on
whom it is levied, and (3) the ultimate use of the money. 53 The
charge is a "fee" if the entity imposing it is a regulatory agency,
the burdened population is small, and the funds raised from the
charge are used for the benefit of the people or organizations that
are regulated. It is a "tax" if it is imposed by the state, on many,
and for the benefit of many. Applying its test to the facts, the court
found that charges imposed by the California Apple Commission

San Juan Cellular, 967 F2d at 685.
Id.
48 Id.
49 Id at 685-86, citing Mississippi Power & Light Co v United States
Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 601 F2d 223, 228, 231-32 (5th Cir 1979).
50 San Juan Cellular, 967 F2d at 685.
51 73 F3d 925 (9th Cir 1996).
52 Id at 930-31. The court considered importing a test from bankruptcy
law, but it
concluded that the bankruptcy test would make the reach of the TIA too broad. See id at
928-29, citing In re FarmersFrozen Food Co, 221 F Supp 385, 387 (ND Cal 1963).
53 Bidart, 73 F3d at 931-33.
46

47

The University of Chicago Law Review

2112

[84:2103

(an agency) on apple producers (a narrow group) to pay for promoting apple sales (a narrow use) were fees, and thus not protected by the TIA.54 Therefore, the federal district court had jurisdiction over the apple producer's suit for injunctive relief.55
2.

Judge Posner promotes a single-factor "user fee" test.

Despite the apparent simplicity of Bidart's three-factor test,
which continues to be cited as good law, courts have resisted a
uniform approach to categorizing charges under the TIA. Judge
Posner, for instance, has been the strongest advocate of reducing
the problem to a single factor: comparing the amount of the government charge to the cost of the government service provided or
regulation applied to the charged party, though his approach differs from other Seventh Circuit decisions during the same time
period.56 Posner's single-factor test can be seen simply as a refinement of San Juan Cellular, which stated that "[c]ourts facing
cases that lie near the middle of this spectrum have tended . .. to
emphasize the revenue's ultimate use, asking whether it provides
a general benefit to the public ... or defrays the agency's costs of
regulation."57 In effect, Posner takes the third factor from the
Bidart test, isolates it as the only important factor, and construes
it mathematically. Thus, when "users of the public way" impose
calculable costs on the government, the government can impose a
"user fee" up to the amount of those costs without such charges
being characterized as "taxes."58
Posner first addressed the tax-nontax distinction in Diginet,
Inc v Western Union ATS, Inc,59 although it was not a TIA case.
Illinois law prohibits cities from taxing without permission from
the state, but it allows them to regulate, with any assessments
that might entail.60 Drawing exclusively on cases involving municipal regulation of public utilities, Posner wrote that the rule

54

Id.

Id at 933.
56 For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit decisions in Hager v City of West Peoria,
55

84 F3d 865 (7th Cir 1996), and Kathrein v City of Evanston, 636 F3d 906 (7th Cir 2011),
see Part II.A.3. I have separated Posner's approach from the rest of the Seventh Circuit in
order to highlight his unique and influential approach to the problem. Though I conclude
below that his approach fails to grapple with the category of penalties, his clarity and
consistency are persuasive in a convoluted area of law.
57 San Juan Cellular, 967 F2d at 685.
58 Diginet, Inc v Western Union ATS, Inc, 958 F2d 1388, 1399 (7th Cir 1992).
59 958 F2d 1388 (7th Cir 1992).
60 Id at 1399.
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for distinguishing a tax from a "user fee" is whether "the fee is a
reasonable estimate of the cost imposed by the person required to
pay the fee."61 In contrast, a "tax" generates revenue beyond the
cost of the service or regulation and can be used to "offset unrelated costs."62 Posner was quick to point out that this test does not
depend on how the city labels the charge, so a city cannot "circumvent this limitation by calling a tax something else."63

Under the facts of the case, Western Union had laid a fiberoptic network in underground ducts owned by the City of Chicago,
after receiving permission from the Department of Public
Works.64 When higher officials in the city government noticed the
installation, they imposed a "franchise fee" of 3 percent of network revenues.65 Under Posner's construction, such a charge
could be characterized as a fee if it offset costs that the fiber-optic
network imposed on the city, but Posner, speaking for the panel
majority, found no evidence of any costs imposed on the city.66 It

was a pure play for revenue. Therefore, the "franchise fee" was,
"by this test, a tax, not a user fee."67

In Empress Casino Joliet Corp v Balmoral Racing Club, Inc,68
Posner, writing for an en banc majority, applied his "user fee" test
to the TIA specifically, but also acknowledged the "fuzzy" problem
of penalties, which tend to function like taxes. Because the TIA
forces litigants into an alternate forum-state courts rather than
federal courts-Posner called for a "crisp rule distinguishing
taxes from other exactions," and he voiced his dismay with previous cases "flirt[ing] with open-ended, multifactor

tests."69

In con-

trast, Posner posited that there are three categories of government charges: penalties, used to punish rather than generate
revenue; fees, which function as prices for government services or
regulations; and taxes, a catchall category. 70 If a charge is neither
a fee nor a penalty, it must be a tax. Whether a charge is a fee is
easily determined under the "user fee" test from Diginet.71 But

61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Diginet, 958 F3d at 1399.
64 Id at 1391.
65 Id.
66 Id at 1392.
67 Diginet, 958 F3d at 1399.
68 651 F3d 722 (7th Cir 2011) (en banc).
69 Id at 726-27.
70 Id at 729-30.
71

Id at 728.
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distinguishing taxes from penalties is more difficult, as both raise
revenue beyond any costs imposed on the government. While
Posner admitted that "a tax might be so totally punitive in purpose and effect that, since nomenclature is unimportant, it should
be classified as a [penalty]" instead of a tax, he did not discuss
how to tell them apart. 72 Finally, he maintained that how a legislature labels a charge should hold little weight because the word
"'[t]axation' is unpopular these days," and legislatures have other
motives for their labels besides the TIA.73

3.

Courts in more recent cases tend to focus on the
legislative purpose behind the enactment.

In spite of Posner's best efforts, courts in the Seventh Circuit
and many others have failed to coalesce around a single standard
of analysis. In general, more recent decisions tend to be concerned
with divining the legislative purpose behind a charge's enactment. For example, in interpreting San Juan Cellular, the Fourth
Circuit stated that when a tax falls in the middle of the spectrum,
"the most important factor becomes the purpose behind the statute."74 While this construction relies on many of the same factors
as traditional multifactor tests-and even Posner's "user fee"
test-this emphasis on legislative purpose is more opaque as to
which factors courts will find to be the most salient.
Consider Hager v City of West Peoria,75a Seventh Circuit case
written by Judge Daniel Manion, in which the court considered
heavy-truck permit fees. First, the court applied the "user fee"
test, concluding that the truck fees would not bring in more revenue than would be necessary to repair the damage they did to
roads.76 At this point, if the panel had included Posner, he likely
would have declared the charge a "fee" and been done with it; the
court did reach that conclusion, but not before considering more
holistic evidence of "why the money [was] taken."77 In particular,

the court relied on testimony from the mayor that the city "intended to regulate" the street on which trucks were driving, as

72

Empress Casino, 651 F3d at 729.

73

Id.

Valero Terrestrial Corp v Caffrey, 205 F3d 130, 134 (4th Cir 2000) (emphasis
added), citing San Juan Cellular, 967 F2d at 685.
75 84 F3d 865 (7th Cir 1996).
74

76
77

Id at 870-71.
Id at 871.
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well as the fact that "[t]he stated purposes in [the text of the ordinance] are public safety and highway maintenance, not revenue
collection."78 Therefore, the court concluded, "We thus have no
doubt that the ordinances were passed to control certain activities, not to raise revenues," meaning that the charge was not a
tax.79 These quotations show that what mattered most to the court
was the legislative purpose behind the ordinance-why was it
passed?
The Hager court's focus on purpose led to the same conclusion
that Posner's "user fee" test or San Juan Cellular's multifactor
test might have (as the charge was imposed on a narrow group for
a narrow purpose). The hardest cases, however, arise not when
charges look like regulatory fees, but when they look like penalties. The primary purpose of a penalty is to control undesirable
behavior. The primary purpose of a tax is to raise revenue. But
when penalties and taxes each do both, the line between them can
be very fuzzy. Under an inquiry into legislative purpose, if the
point is to determine why a legislature imposed a particular
charge, courts must choose between competing explanations of
revenue raising and incentivizing.
For instance, in Kathrein v City of Evanston, 80 the Seventh

Circuit examined an assessment that the city had imposed on
building demolition, which developers were using to clear room
for new residential projects. Despite the charge being labeled a
"tax," the court held that it was a "regulatory device" because it
created a very specific incentive structure for developers.81 The
court's logic focused on determining the underlying purpose of the
law, asking whether it was to raise revenue as a tax or to disincentivize certain behavior as a penalty.82 The court acknowledged
that some taxes on undesirable behavior are still taxes. 83 Ultimately, however, the court found evidence of the law's purpose in
the low amount of overall revenue collected, the segregated fund
into which the money was put, and the law's ability to affect developers' behavior by significantly decreasing the profitability of
new developments.84 Therefore, the court found it was a penalty,
unprotected by the TIA.
78

Id.

Hager, 84 F3d at 871.
80 636 F3d 906 (7th Cir 2011).
81 Id at 910, 912.
79

82

See id at 912.

83

See id.

84

See Kathrein, 636 F3d at 912-13.
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The Tenth Circuit has also faced the problem of penalties under the TIA. In Chamber of Commerce of the United States v
Edmonson,85 the court confronted an Oklahoma law that required
businesses to withhold taxes from independent contractors whose
work eligibility was unverified, or else be liable for the amount
they should have withheld.86 Like Kathrein, the court's analysis
focused on the "purpose" of the statute, but it also cited cases that
line up perfectly with Posner's "user fee" test. 87 The court looked
beyond the use of the money, however, and listed other cases in
which the use of the money was less important than the "incentive structure and avowed purpose."88 In other words, the opinion
makes room for decisions like Kathrein, in which a statute looks
more like a regulatory tool than a revenue generator even though
the money is not used for a specific related purpose. And it is on
that basis that the court decided that the Oklahoma statute was
a penalty, because it provided a clear incentive structure not to
hire contractors with unverified work eligibility, despite the fact
89
that the penalty raised revenue for the general treasury.
4. The Fifth Circuit focuses on the legislative history and
purpose of the TIA.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit is unique in that it tends to emphasize the broadness of the TIA's protection, which leads it to be
more lenient in classifying charges as "taxes." In Home Builders
Association of Mississippi, Inc v City of Madison,90 the court considered a per-unit fee imposed on developers building new residential units in order to support expanding city services. The
court cited all of the relevant precedent, including San Juan
Cellularand Hager, boiling past cases down to the basic proposition that "the classic tax sustains the essential flow of revenue to
the government, while the classic fee is linked to some regulatory
scheme."91 The court also drew on its own precedent in Tramel v
Schrader92 for the proposition that "a broad construction of 'tax'
was necessary to honor Congress's goals in promulgating the Tax
594 F3d 742 (10th Cir 2010).
Id at 750.
87 Id at 761, citing Hill v Kemp, 478 F3d 1236, 1244-46 (10th Cir 2007), and Marcus
v Kansas Department of Revenue, 170 F3d 1305, 1311-12 (10th Cir 1999).
88
Chamber of Commerce, 594 F3d at 762.
89 Id at 763.
143 F3d 1006 (5th Cir 1998).
90
91 Id at 1011.
92 505 F2d 1310 (5th Cir 1975).
85

86
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Injunction Act, including that of preventing federally-based delays in the collection of public revenues by state and local governments."93 The Fifth Circuit, in other words, is sensitive to interruptions in state revenue. Drawing on information from the
preamble of the ordinance at issue in the case, which indicated
that the tax would be used to fund a variety of services-from
street improvements to firefighting14-the court found that the
tax was not linked to any specific regulatory scheme and was
instead intended to fund general improvements. Thus, it was
protected by the TIA.95
B.

Tax Delinquency Penalties Present a Clear Circuit Split

As certain as death and taxes is the fact that some people will
not pay their taxes. In response, many state governments impose
what are known as "tax delinquency penalties." The previous Section noted that courts tend to struggle with penalties, which raise
revenue like taxes but have a primary purpose of regulating behavior. Therefore, as one might predict, litigants who wish to
challenge tax delinquency penalties face uncertainty under the
TIA. A current circuit split on these laws provides an excellent
example of why TIA jurisprudence is in need of reform.
The first court to address the issue of tax delinquency penalties was the Seventh Circuit in RTC Commercial Assets Trust v
Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co.96 This case yielded a sparse opinion in which the court decided that the purpose of tax delinquency
penalties is to penalize, not raise revenue. Although the court
cited intracircuit precedent in Diginet and Hager, it made no effort to apply the logic of either case, whether through the "user
fee" test or a deeper inquiry into legislative purpose. 97 Instead, the
court summarily concluded that "[s]tates do not assess penalties
for the purpose of raising revenue."98 The reason given was that
"[i]n a Utopian world where all citizens complied fully with their
obligations, no penalties at all would be collected," which suggests
that penalties are not "calculated to generate revenues."99 This

93
94

Home Builders, 143 F3d at 1011.
Id at 1012.

95

Id.

96
97

98
99

169 F3d 448 (7th Cir 1999).
Id at 457.
Id.

Id.
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may be an unrealistic view of penalties. For instance, it is academically confirmed (and probably generally assumed) that police
departments count on a constant supply of traffic tickets to make
their budgets.loo
The Fifth Circuit took a similarly surface-level approach to
the problem in Washington v Linebarger, Goggan, Blair, Pena
Sampson, LLP1O ("Washington I"), but it reached the opposite
conclusion: the purpose of tax delinquency penalties is to raise
general revenue, and therefore they are protected as taxes under
the TIA.102 The court stated that tax delinquency penalties are
"inexorably tied to the tax collection itself' and "sustain[ ] the essential flow of revenue to the government."103 Therefore, the court
found that the penalty was properly characterized as a tax for
purposes of the TIA. This decision is consistent with the Fifth
Circuit's sensitivity to the broadness of the TIA in protecting state
revenues, as discussed in the previous Section regarding Home
Builders.104
The dissent, on the other hand, applied a multifactor test
similar to the Bidart test: a charge is a "fee" if it is imposed "(1) by
an agency, not the legislature, (2) upon those it regulates, not the
community as a whole, and (3) for the purpose of defraying regulatory costs." In this case, the first two factors cut in opposite directions: tax delinquency penalties are imposed by the legislature
but on only a small group of people. For the dissent, the deciding
factor was that the "purpose" of the charge was to "control the
behavior of delinquent taxpayers."105 Therefore, the dissent would
have characterized this charge as a fee or penalty, not covered by
the protection of the TIA.
The Fifth Circuit doubled down on its decision in Washington
v New OrleansO6 ('Washington II"). After her claim was dismissed

100 See Michael D. Makowsky and Thomas Stratmann, Political Economy at Any
Speed: What Determines Traffic Citations?, 99 Am Econ Rev 509, 517 (2009) (finding that
drivers are 26 percent more likely to be fined for a traffic stop when in a municipality that
fits a proxy variable for fiscal distress); Thomas A. Garrett and Gary A. Wagner, Red Ink
in the Rearview Mirror:Local Fiscal Conditions and the Issuance of Traffic Tickets, 52 J L
& Econ 71, 86 (2009) (finding that "negative changes in local revenue from the previous
fiscal year are significantly correlated with the change in the number of tickets issued").
101 338 F3d 442 (5th Cir 2003).
102 Id at 444.
103 Id, quoting Home Builders, 143 F3d at 1011.
104 See Home Builders, 143 F3d at 1011-12. See also Part II.A.4.
105 Washington I, 338 F3d at 446-48 (Duval dissenting).
106 424 Fed Appx 307 (5th Cir 2011).
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from federal court, plaintiff Denise Washington successfully challenged Louisiana's delinquent tax penalty in state court as unconstitutional under the Louisiana Constitution (proving, incidentally, that "a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had
in the courts of such State").107 She then refiled a putative class
action, asking the federal court to reconsider its decision in light
of the state court's determination that it was an unconstitutional
charge. The federal district court rejected her claim, reiterating
its first decision that "the penalty was 'inexorably tied' to tax collection."108 The court then resummarized its reasoning: "Because
the penalty directly sought to 'sustain the essential flow of revenue to the government,' it falls within the broad scope of § 1341."109
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Fifth Circuit
that tax delinquency penalties are taxes in a short unpublished
opinion in Huang v City of Los Angeles.110 Without stating its reasoning, the court concluded that "[a]pplying Bidart, the business
taxes assessed by the City of Los Angeles, as well as the penalties
added thereto for delinquent payment, are 'taxes' under the
TIA."mll One could, however, attempt to re-create the court's logic

under the Bidart three-part test. The entity that imposed the
citywide tax was the city itself (indicative of a tax), the charge fell
on only a small number of delinquent payers (fee), and the charge
presumably funded general government activity rather than being dedicated to a specific program (tax). With two out of three
factors favoring a tax, the court could then have decided that the
TIA barred the case.

In summary, circuit courts are split on how tax delinquency
penalties should be characterized for purposes of the TIA. The
Seventh Circuit holds that tax delinquency penalties are not
taxes, and therefore not subject to the TIA, while the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits hold that they are. These cases prove that, under
current TIA jurisprudence, courts are free to select one of a number of different approaches, each emphasizing different factors
and all failing to provide a systematic way to distinguish taxes

Id at 309-10.
Id at 310, quoting Washington I, 338 F3d at 444.
109 Washington 11, 424 Fed Appx at 311, quoting Home Builders, 143 F3d at 1011.
110 637 Fed Appx 363 (9th Cir 2016), cert denied, 137 S Ct 294 (2016).
Ill Id at 364.
107
108
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from fees and penalties. The next Part, however, offers a much
simpler test.
III. RECENT SUPREME COURT CASES PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY
To REEXAMINE CURRENT LAW

The current state of the tax-nontax distinction under the TIA
is so fragmented in part because the Supreme Court has never
addressed the question of which test or factors should be used to
determine whether a government charge is a tax. Within the last
decade, however, the Supreme Court has decided two cases with
potentially significant consequences for the TIA: NFIB v Sebelius
in 2012 and Direct Marketing Association v Brohl in 2015.
Part III.A introduces Brohl, in which the Supreme Court rejected an expansive reading of the text of the TIA based on its
historical purposes in favor of a highly textual interpretation.
While Brohl does not deal with the definition of "tax" specifically,
the decision tends to foreclose any solution relying exclusively on
legislative history favoring state protection. On the other hand,
Part III.B discusses NFIB, a case under the AIA, which endorses
a construction under which a charge qualifies as a "tax" if it is
labeled as such. Part III.C makes the legal case under current
Supreme Court precedent for why the new AIA label test should
be applied to the TIA, and Part III.D discusses its practical effects, including the simplicity that the label test would bring to
courts and litigants and the political pressures that could keep
states from abusing newfound power.
A.

Brohl Precludes an Isolated Appeal to Legislative Purpose

One possible solution to the problems of defining "tax" under
the TIA would be to follow the lead of the Fifth Circuit in Home
Builders, Washington I, and Washington II. In each case, the
Fifth Circuit looked to the legislative purpose and history of the
TIA to arrive at a broad definition of "tax." According to that
court, the TIA ought to be interpreted broadly in order to fulfill
Congress's intent to avoid federal interference in state and local
revenue collection.112 The Fifth Circuit also highlighted the
Supreme Court's previous statements about the Act, stating that
the "statutory text should be interpreted to advance its purpose

112 Home Builders, 143 F3d at 1011, citing Tramel v Schrader, 505 F2d 1310, 1316
(5th Cir 1975).
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of 'confin[ing] federal-court intervention in state government."'1
The Fifth Circuit's approach, at its strongest, deems the vast majority of charges to be "taxes" for purposes of the TIA. There may
still be penalties so punitive and rare, or fees so tiny and incidental, that they might fall outside such a broad definition of
"tax." Regardless, such an approach-legitimately rooted in the
legislative purpose of the TIA-could simplify the majority of TIA
cases.
Brohl, however, shows the weakness of this approach. In
Brohl, the Court addressed a different part of the statute, dealing
not with the definition of "tax" but of "assessment, levy, or collection." Without even mentioning legislative history, the Court
reached its decision by analogizing to other sections of the tax
code. The Colorado statute at issue required out-of-state sellers,
who are not required to collect state sales taxes, to provide a notice to buyers that buyers are liable for Colorado use taxes and to
provide names to the state of all buyers who purchased more than
$500 worth of goods.114 Retailers were subject to a $10 fine for
each buyer not notified and each buyer not reported to the state.11 5
The Direct Marketing Association (DMA), a trade association for
out-of-state retailers, challenged the notice requirements in federal court under the Commerce Clause.116
When the Tenth Circuit first heard Brohl, the parties did not
anticipate that the TIA would be an issue. The court, however,
raised its own inquiry of the TIA sua sponte and decided that
DMA was asking it to "enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection" of Colorado taxes." 7 To reach that conclusion, the Tenth Circuit cited the legislative purpose of the act,
much like the Fifth Circuit's approach, recognizing the TIA's
"roots in equity practice, in principles of federalism, and in recognition of the imperative need of a State to administer its own fiscal operations."11s Based on these principles, the Tenth Circuit

gave the word "restrain" a broad enough reading to include
Colorado's notice requirements and their accompanying charges,
barring the suit in federal court under the TIA."s
113 Washington I, 338 F3d at 444, quoting Arkansas v Farm Credit Services of Central
Arkansas, 520 US 821, 826-27 (1997).
114 Brohl, 135 S Ct at 1128.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Direct Marketing Association v Brohl, 735 F3d 904, 909 (10th Cir 2013).
118 Id at 910.
119 Id at 912-13.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari to reverse the Tenth
Circuit, finding that the suit was not barred by the TIA because
the Colorado notice and reporting requirements were not an "assessment, levy, or collection."12o Rather than basing its decision
on the history or purpose of the Act, the Court looked to the federal tax code for statutes that would help define "assessment,
levy, or collection." The Court found that the gathering of information, which included the private reporting of tax information
to the government, was a phase that happened before "assessment," which was the "official recording of a taxpayer's liability."121 Therefore, plaintiffs were free to challenge the charge in
federal court. Brohl does not address the definition of "tax" under
the TIA, but it does provide a recent look at how the Supreme
Court approaches the TIA. While the legislative history and purpose continue to be important considerations in TIA jurisprudence, this decision helps to show that invocations of purpose
alone are not a strong enough approach to redefine "tax" for purposes of the TIA.
B.

NFIB Provides a Clear Test Based on Labels

In one of the landmark Supreme Court cases of recent
memory, the NFIB Court upheld the constitutionality of the ACA
22
without resorting to the Commerce Power.1 In an opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court held that the "individual mandate," a charge imposed by the statute, was a "tax" for
purposes of the Constitution, and therefore constitutional under
the taxing power, but not a "tax" for purposes of the AIA because
Congress had labeled it a "penalty." Therefore, the suit was not
barred by the AIA.

Brohl, 135 S Ct at 1129-30.
Id at 1130. It is worth noting that there is no universal federal definition of "tax"
elsewhere in federal law like there is for "assessment, levy, or collection." At least, no circuit court has so far claimed to have found one. So while the Supreme Court's decision in
Brohl helps show that legislative purpose alone will not suffice when defining words under
the TIA, it does not offer a positive path toward a solution for the definition of "tax."
122 See Reid Pillifant, How John Roberts Saved Obamacareby Ignoring Obama's 'Tax'
Argument (Politico, June 28, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/8P3H-ZP72; David Cole,
ObamacareUpheld: How and Why Did Justice Roberts Do It? (The Nation, June 28, 2012),
online at http://www.thenation.com/article/obamacare-upheld-how-and-why-did-justice
-roberts-do-it/ (visited June 1, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable); Tom Scocca, Obama
Wins the Battle, Roberts Wins the War (Slate, June 28, 2012), archived at
120
121

http://perma.cc/2T3G-3NF8.
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In order to keep health insurance costs down by ensuring
large insurance pools, Congress included the individual mandate,123 a charge imposed on citizens who choose not to purchase
health insurance, which Congress labeled a "penalty."124 Plaintiffs
claimed that Congress did not have the power under the
Constitution to enact the individual mandate. The Court held
that the charge was a proper exercise of Congress's power to tax
under the Taxing and Spending Clause125 rather than an exercise
of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. 126 But the
individual mandate had yet to take effect, and because it was upheld as an exercise of the taxing power, the suit might have been
barred by the AIA's prohibition on "restraining the assessment or
collection of any tax."12

Several circuit courts heard cases on the ACA, but none held
that the individual mandate was an exercise of the taxing power
while also avoiding the jurisdictional bar of the AIA. The litigation also caused an intercircuit squabble over whether labels
should govern the operation of the AIA, which was a standard
that the courts had never endorsed, at least explicitly. The Sixth
Circuit weighed in first in Thomas More Law Center v Obama,12s
holding that the individual mandate was a "penalty" because
Congress had labeled it as such: "While the Anti-Injunction Act
applies only to 'tax[es],' Congress called the shared-responsibility
payment a 'penalty."'129 The Sixth Circuit then upheld the constitutionality of the ACA under the Commerce Clause.130 In contrast,
the Fourth Circuit found in Liberty University, Inc v Geithner13
that the individual mandate was a "tax," such that the case was
barred by the AIA.132 The Fourth Circuit then singled out the
123 See Susan Rupe, The Individual Mandate: It's What Keeps Everyone
in the Risk
Pool (InsuranceNewsNet, Nov 18, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/NFN4-9FTC.
124 26 USC § 5000A(b)(1) ("If a taxpayer ...
fails to meet the requirement of [minimum essential coverage] for 1 or more months, then . . . there is hereby imposed on the
taxpayer a penalty.") (emphasis added).
125 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 1 ("The Congress shall have
Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises .... ).
126 The Commerce Clause theory was advanced by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in a
concurring opinion, joined by three other members of the Court. See NFIB, 567 US at 589646 (Ginsburg concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part).
127 NFIB, 567 US at 543.
128 651 F3d 529 (6th Cir 2011).
129 Id at 539 (citation omitted). For the relevant language from the ACA,
see note 124.
130 Thomas More, 651 F3d at 544.
131 671 F3d 391 (4th Cir 2011).
132 Id at 405.

The University of Chicago Law Review

2124

[84:2103

Sixth Circuit: "[N]o federal appellate court, except the Sixth
Circuit in Thomas More, has ever held that the label affixed to an
exaction controls, or is even relevant to, the applicability of the
AIA."133 The DC Circuit, however, rode to the Sixth Circuit's rescue in Seven-Sky v Holder,134 in which the court held that the label
35
"penalty" was a "deliberate" choice by Congress.1 The court argued that while labels may not have been an explicit standard,
they explained past AIA jurisprudence: "[A]side from the Fourth
Circuit's recent decision, no court has ever held that 'any tax' under the Anti-Injunction Act includes exactions that Congress deliberately called 'penalties."' 136
The Supreme Court settled the issue with two separate conclusions. First, the Court held that the test for "tax" under the
taxing power need not be the same as the test for "tax" under the
AIA. Congress cannot change whether something is a tax for constitutional purposes. For instance, Congress might hypothetically
impose a criminal penalty on a defendant who had been acquitted
in court, but call it a "tax" in an attempt to circumvent the Double
Jeopardy Clause.137 Such a label would obviously not protect the
penalty from a constitutional challenge. Second, the Court held
that labels were important tools for guiding the application of the
AIA. The majority opinion noted that both the AIA and the ACA
are

"creatures of Congress's

own creation."138

Therefore,

if

Congress wants to exempt the ACA from application of the AIA,
it can, and in this case it did, implicitly, by labeling the individual
mandate a "penalty."139 This result does not mean that Congress
is always bound by its labels. Congress could have been more explicit about its intent by, for example, including the following in
the statute: "[T]his penalty is a 'tax' for purposes of the ALA."
However, Congress did no such thing, so the Court determined
that the label was determinative of whether Congress wanted the
AIA to apply.

138

Id at 404.
661 F3d 1 (DC Cir 2011).
Id at 6.
Id at 7.
NFIB, 567 US at 544.
Id.

139

Id.

133

134
135
136
137
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The NFIB Label Test Should Be Applied to the TIA

NFIB stands for the proposition that courts must look at the
label applied to a government charge to determine whether
Congress meant for that charge to qualify as a "tax" under the
AIA. If applied to the TIA, this label test would dramatically simplify the tax-nontax inquiry, for the benefit of both potential litigants and judicial efficiency. If the state statute labels a charge a
"tax," then that tax would receive the protection of the TIA. This
Section explores several reasons why NFIB's label test ought to
be applied to the TIA despite the fact that NFIB is an AIA case.
Most importantly, it argues that federal courts have a longestablished practice of using AIA as persuasive precedent in TIA
cases. Finally, it argues that such a reinterpretation of the TIA is
supported by its history and purpose.
The reason that courts do not already look to state law to define "tax" is because the TIA is a federal law. This line of reasoning goes back to the Fifth Circuit decision in Tramel, one of the
earliest disputes over the word "tax" under the TIA. In Tramel,
the plaintiffs argued that Texas state courts had determined that
the charges at issue were not taxes and thus that their suit should
remain in federal court. The Fifth Circuit stated that "[t]he proper
question is not what the Texas courts have said the Texas legislature meant when it used the term [tax] but what Congress
meant when it used the term."140 Since Tramel, circuit courts

have repeated the proposition that the word "tax" is governed by
federal law.141

That is a reasonable reading of the TIA, but not a necessary
one. Just as Congress can choose how its own laws interact, it
could choose to place discretion over the interaction of state and

140 Tramel, 505 F2d at 1315 n 7.
141 See, for example, Robinson ProtectiveAlarm Co v City of Philadelphia,
581 F2d
371, 374 (3d Cir 1978) ("The Tramel court denied any controlling effect to state courts'
distinctions between taxes and special assessments."); TrailerMarine Transport Corp v
Rivera Vazquez, 977 F2d 1, 5 (1st Cir 1992) ("Puerto Rico's decision to call the fee a
'contribution' or 'premium' . . . rather than a 'tax' may be pertinent but does not decide
the matter, for it is federal law that determines what constitutes a tax for this purpose."), citing Robinson Protective, 581 F2d at 374. See also, for example, Bidart, 73 F3d
at 933 ("Regardless of the labels placed on the Commission's duties and functions, its
assessments are not 'taxes' within the meaning of the TIA."); Diginet, 958 F2d at 1399
("[The city] may not circumvent this limitation by calling a tax something else, such as
a 'franchise fee."').
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federal law in the hands of states by "incorporating" state-law labels.142 This Comment argues that such a reading of the TIA is
supported by the text of the statute, its legislative history, and its
purpose as explained by the Supreme Court. The impetus for reinterpreting the TIA is NFIB itself. By articulating a label test for
the AIA against a background of interpreting the AIA and TIA in
unison, the Supreme Court has implicitly endorsed referring to
state law to define "tax" under the TIA.
1. AIA and TIA precedent are used interchangeably.
Due to the parallel natures of the TIA and the AIA, there is
a substantial amount of crossover in their interpretation-that is,
courts tend to regard a decision about one act as persuasive
precedent, at the least, for a case under the other. The most explicit endorsement of this interpretive method comes from Brohl,
in which the Supreme Court stated:
In defining the terms of the TIA, we have looked to federal
tax law as a guide. Although the TIA does not concern federal
taxes, it was modeled on the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA), which
does.

. .

. We assume that words used in both Acts are gener-

ally used in the same way, and we discern the meaning of the
terms in the AIA by reference to the broader Tax Code.143
Relying on Brohl, the Ninth Circuit has declared that "the
Court construes the two Acts in tandem."144 Brohl endorsed the
practice of using one act to interpret the other as it appeared in
The idea that Congress can rely on state legislatures in the course of federal lawmaking is an uncontroversial proposition. Usually, this this is phrased as "incorporation"
of state law. See, for example, Radha A. Pathak, IncorporatedState Law, 61 Case W Reserve L Rev 823, 838 (2011) ("Any type of federal law-constitutional, statutory, or judicial-can borrow state law, and state law can be borrowed for either substantive or procedural purposes."). Consider, for instance, the Air Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act, passed by Congress in the wake of the September 11 attacks. This enactment created a federal cause of action for victims against airlines. But instead of recreating all of tort and contract law, the federal statute simply incorporated all relevant
state law: "The substantive law for decision in any such suit shall be derived from the law,
including choice of law principles, of the State in which the crash occurred." See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 408(b)(2), Pub L No 107-42, 115 Stat 232,
241 (2001). Under federal statutes like these, states can dramatically alter the substance
of federal law by changing their own law. In contrast, this Comment argues merely that
the TIA can and does rely on a single word in state law-the label given to a chargewhen determining whether the statute is a tax, a much less dramatic incorporation of
state law.
143 Brohl, 135 S Ct at 1129 (citations omitted).
144 Fredrickson v Starbucks Corp, 840 F3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir 2016).
142
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Hibbs v Winn,145 a TIA case in which Justice Anthony Kennedy
wrote a dissent that looked to the AIA for aid in defining "assessment."146 The current also runs the other way, from TIA to AIA.

Because the older AIA has no legislative history, the Supreme
Court has quoted the Senate report on the TIA in order to state
the purpose of the AIA.147
Lower courts have followed suit. For example, the Ninth
Circuit cited an AIA case to support its conclusion that an injunction against paycheck withholding is equivalent to an injunction
against tax collection itself under the TIA.148 Similarly, the
Eastern District of Kentucky used Winn, a TIA case, to support
its decision that a requested injunction against allegedly unconstitutional tax credits was not barred by the AIA.149 Other examples come from the DC Circuit,150 the Southern District of
Alabama,15' and the District of New Jersey.12 Using AIA and TIA
precedent interchangeably is pedestrian enough that courts
sometimes fail to mention that they are citing precedent arising
under separate statutes, or explicitly state that they will not be
distinguishing the cases.15 3 Furthermore, this practice of reading
the statutes together even extends to a third statute, the Butler
Act,154 which accomplishes the same function in the jurisdiction of
Puerto Rico. The most obvious case is San Juan Cellular, a Butler

145

542 US 88 (2004).

146 Id at 115 (Kennedy dissenting), citing Laing v United States,
423 US 161, 170

n 13 (1976).
147 See Enochs v Williams Packing& Navigation Co, 370 US 1, 7 & n 6 (1962) (relying
on the Senate report on the TIA to support the assertion that, under the AIA, "the United
States is assured of prompt collection of its lawful revenue"), citing S Rep No 75-1035 (cited
in note 24).
148 See Fredrickson,840 F3d at 1122, citing United States v American Friends
Service
Committee, 419 US 7, 10 (1974).
149 See AmericanAtheists, Inc v Shulman, 21 F Supp 3d 856, 868-69
(ED Ky 2014).
150 See Cohen v United States, 650 F3d 717, 730-31 (DC Cir 2011).
151 See NationalFederationof Republican Assemblies v United States, 148 F Supp 2d
1273, 1286 & n 16 (SD Ala 2001).
152 See Pazzo Pazzo, Inc v New Jersey, 2007 WL 4166017, *3
(D NJ).
153 See, for example, FloridaBankers Association v United States
Department of the
Treasury, 799 F3d 1065, 1074 n 2 (DC Cir 2015) (Randolph concurring) (stating that the
opinion would "refer to the AIA only" even though "some of the cases cited herein interpret
the Tax Injunction Act").
154 Butler Act Amendments § 7, 44 Stat 1418, 1421 (1927), codified at 48
USC § 872
("No suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax imposed by
the laws of Puerto Rico shall be maintained in the United States District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico.").
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Act case that courts interpreting the TIA have cited repeatedly.155
This is by no means, however, an isolated incident.15e
The practice of interpreting the TIA and AIA in tandem follows from their similar language and purposes, and some opinions are explicit about these similarities. The Supreme Court itself has stated: "The Tax Injunction Act was thus shaped by state
and federal provisions [such as the AIA] barring anticipatory actions by taxpayers to stop the tax collector from initiating collection proceedings."157 In using bankruptcy decisions under the AIA
to decide a TIA case, the Southern District of New York wrote,
"the two statutes should be interpreted in a harmonious manner."158 Because the acts are to be interpreted in tandem, differ-

ences in their texts have been used to justify contrasting interpretations. In Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc v Sebelius,159 then-Judge Neil
Gorsuch, in a concurrence, compared the statutes, finding that
differences in their texts justified a jurisdictional reading of the
TIA ("The district courts shall not enjoin") in contrast to a nonshall be mainjurisdictional reading of the AIA ("no suit ...
not affect the
do
statutes
tained").160 While differences in the
analysis in this Comment, due to their nearly identical relevant
provisions, this contrasting interpretation proves the rule that, in
general, the acts mean the same thing. Furthermore, Gorsuch
stated that, if anything, the difference was evidence that the TIA
provided even greater protection to state tax laws than the AIA
did to federal laws.161

2. The label test is consistent with the text and purpose of
the TIA.
The Supreme Court has endorsed interpreting the AIA and
TIA in a parallel manner, and the previous Section argued that,
under this default rule, NFIB's label test should apply to the TIA.
One could argue that the label test makes more sense as applied
155 See Part II.A.

See, for example, Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, Inc v Zaragoza-Gomez, 834 F3d 110, 119
(1st Cir 2016) ("As acknowledged above, the Butler Act and the TIA have been construed
in pari materia in our circuit, which has extended the TIA's exception to the Butler Act.")
(quotation marks omitted).
157 Jefferson County v Acker, 527 US 423, 435 (1999).
158 McCrory Corp v Ohio, 212 BR 229, 232-33 (SDNY 1997).
159 723 F3d 1114 (10th Cir 2013) (en banc).
160 Id at 1158 (Gorsuch concurring), quoting 28 USC § 1341 and 26 USC § 7421 (em156

phasis omitted).
161 Hobby Lobby, 723 F3d at 1158 (Gorsuch concurring).
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to the AIA than the TIA, because Congress can control labels elsewhere in federal law, but it can't control state law.162 This Section
lays out additional reasons why the default rule should still control. The label test would allow states to take shelter under the
TIA by choosing whether to label charges as "taxes." This broad
protection is consistent with the text, legislative history, and underlying purpose of the act as articulated by the Supreme Court.
a) The text of the TIA. First, the text of the TIA is consistent with looking to state statutes to decide which charges are
"taxes" for purposes of the Act. The Act states that "[t]he district
courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy
or collection of any tax under State law."163 The phrase "under

State law" is ambiguous. It certainly means that the law protects
state taxes, as opposed to federal taxes. But it could also mean,
more specifically, that the law applies to taxes labeled as such
"under state law."
A plain-text reading of the statute does not favor one interpretation over the other. At the very least, allowing state-law labels to determine which charges are protected by the TIA is not
in conflict with the text. Furthermore, a construction of the statute that looks to state statutes to define "tax" is consistent with
how Congress has used "under state law" previously. Consider,
for instance, 5 USC § 8478, in which an exception to Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation insurance is available only "if the
bank or institution meets bonding requirements under State law
which the Secretary of Labor determines are at least equivalent
to those imposed on banks by Federal law."164 This passage means
that the bonding requirements are not only derived from state law
but also defined by state law, just like "tax" would be if the label
test were applied to the TIA.
b) Legislative history and purpose. Congressional reports
accompanying the TIA, as well as the text of the act, make it clear
that the legislative history and purpose of the statute is consistent with broader protections for state tax laws. Although
Brohl ruled out an approach that relies exclusively on these considerations, they still provide good support for the new label test.
Part I of this Comment documented Congress's concern for state

162

though
course,
163
164

It would still have the power to create particular exceptions to state-law labels,
it would presumably never spend time on such a small matter in practice. Of
it would also have the power to abolish the label test by statute.
28 USC § 1341 (emphasis added).
5 USC § 8478.
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revenues at the time that it passed the Act. The Senate report
accompanying the bill noted that many states already had statutes mandating that taxpayers in state courts "pay first and then
litigate."165 The law was proposed for two reasons: because the
idea that persons and corporations outside the state could sue in
diversity without paying first was "highly unfair" and because the
ability of foreigners, especially large foreign corporations, to withhold money during lengthy litigation would "seriously disrupt
State and county finances."166
Adopting the label test would put more power in the hands of
states to take advantage of the TIA. These cases inevitably pit the
state interest in tax collection against the taxpayer's interest of
litigating in federal court before payment. But the Senate report
comprehended this battle of rights in enacting the statute and
concluded that taxpayers were already well protected: "It should
be emphasized that the bill does not take away any equitable
right of the taxpayer or deprive him of his day in court."167 Specifically, the report noted that the text of the act allowed for federal
jurisdiction in the absence of a "plain, speedy, and efficient remedy" in state court.168 If a taxpayer does not like the results in
state court, "[a]n appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States is available as in other cases."169

To Congress's concern for the state and local fisc, the
Supreme Court has added a strong concern for judicial federalism
and comity: "[T]he statute has its roots in equity practice, in principles of federalism, and in recognition of the imperative need of
a State to administer its own fiscal operations."170 For this reason,
Supreme Court precedent on this topic emphasizes the broad protection that the TIA is supposed to afford. The Court declared in
Rosewell v LaSalle National Bank71 that "this legislation was
first and foremost a vehicle to limit drastically federal district
165 S Rep No 75-1035 at 2 (cited in note 24). The report from the House Committee on
the Judiciary incorporated the Senate report in its entirety. See generally Suits Relating
to Collection of State Taxes, H Rep No 75-1503, 75th Cong, 1st Sess (1937).
166

S Rep No 75-1035 at 2 (cited in note 24).

167

Id.

168

Id.

Id. The statutory grant for the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over such
cases comes from 28 USC § 1257(a), which states that the Supreme Court may review
decisions "rendered by the highest court of a State" for which the validity of a federal
statute is questioned or a state law is alleged to be in conflict with the Constitution or a
federal law.
170 Tully u Griffin, Inc, 429 US 68, 73 (1976).
171 450 US 503 (1981).
169

2017]

The Label Test

2131

court jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local concern as
the collection of taxes."172 More recently, the Court reaffirmed its
characterization in Rosewell by stressing its commitment to federalism: "The federal balance is well served when the several
States define and elaborate their own laws through their own
courts and administrative processes and without undue interference from the Federal Judiciary."173 This understanding continues
to govern federal courts; as the Sixth Circuit has written, "The
TIA's prohibition of federal court restraint of state or local taxation encompasses a broad array of state and local taxes."174 The
current crop of cases, under which states are forced to shoehorn
their collections into a judge-made definition of "tax," is inconsistent with the "drastic" limitation that the TIA was meant to impose on federal interference with state tax collections. NFIB, on the
other hand, would allow states to take consistent advantage of the
protection that Congress afforded them under the TIA.
D.

Implementing the Label Test

This final Section discusses how the label test could simplify
the work of litigants and courts in practice, as well as how the
position of states and litigants would change under the new regime. While it is true that states would gain wide discretion to
take advantage of the TIA, litigants would be freed from much
uncertainty and would retain postcollection options to challenge
state charges. Furthermore, state constitutional limits on taxation and political pressures would limit states' abuse of the TIA.
1. A dramatically simpler test for courts and litigants.
In general, implementing the label test under the TIA should
be simple. If the state or local statute labels the exaction a tax, it
is a tax. That simplicity is its main benefit. Take, for example, the
hallmark case of Bidart, in which the Ninth Circuit devoted more
than a dozen paragraphs and over three thousand words to develop and apply a multifactor test. 175 The court finally concluded
that a one-quarter-cent charge per pound of apples was a fee, due
to its origin from an agency, the narrowness of its incidence, and

Id at 522.
Arkansas v Farm Credit Services of CentralArkansas, 520 US 821, 826 (1997).
174 Laborde v City of Gahanna, 561 Fed Appx 476, 479 (6th Cir 2014).
172

173

175 See generally Bidart, 73 F3d 925.
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its purpose of promoting the apple industry.16 The new label test
under NFIB would have been limited to the following query: How
does the statute refer to the charge? The statute refers to the
charge as an "assessment"177 and as a "fee,"178 but never as a tax.
Therefore, the TIA would not bar the case from federal court.
Such a simple test would not only aid judicial efficiency but also
alleviate uncertainty for litigants looking to challenge state
charges.
The label test is even simpler than Judge Posner's "user fee"
test, on two counts. First, the "user fee" test requires some estimate of the cost of the regulation, in order to compare it to the fee
charged to the regulated person or firm. The cases specifically addressed by Posner were cases in which the cost of the regulation
79
was zero, making it easy to decide that the charge was a tax.1
But in Hager, the city imposed a charge of $12.50 on trucks over
80
eight tons and $20.00 on trucks over fifteen tons.1 A court would
need expert testimony about how much damage heavy-truck traffic does to roads in order to see what costs it imposes on the city.181
In this case, the district court accepted that the charges "could
conceivably exceed the costs imposed by heavy truck traffic,"182
while the Seventh Circuit concluded that the charges "could not
exceed the amount necessary to pay for the road repair."183 The
label test, on the other hand, does away with the necessity of
quantifying such costs as road damage. Because the charge was
labeled a "permit fee," this case would not be barred by the TIA.
The other difficulty with the "user fee" test is that it cannot
account for the category of penalties. Posner admits that a charge
"might be so totally punitive in purpose and effect that, since nomenclature is unimportant, it should be classified as a fine,"184 but
he does not discuss where to draw the line. Penalties flummox
courts because they raise revenue like a tax, but have a primary

176
177
178

Id at 931-33.
See Cal Food & Ag Code

§ 75630(a)-(d).

See Cal Food & Ag Code § 75630(d).
179 See Diginet, 958 F2d at 1392 (finding that the activity of laying fiber optic cables
"imposes no costs, congestion or otherwise"); Empress Casino, 651 F3d at 730 (holding that
the tax is an example of "a state's taking money from one group of firms and giving it to
another group," untethered from any specific regulations).
180 Hager, 84 F3d at 867.

181 Id at 871.
182

Id at 870.

183 Id at 871.
184 Empress Casino, 651 F3d at 729.
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purpose of modifying behavior. Take, for instance, the current circuit split over state tax delinquency penalties, discussed in
Part II.C. Under the label test, these charges would not be covered by the TIA. This conclusion might only take one paragraph
of an opinion. If states felt that certain claims belonged in state
court, they could modify the label attached to their law.
Litigants would also benefit from the label test's mitigation
of uncertainty. Take, for instance, the class action plaintiffs in
Washington I and Washington II. These plaintiffs had to appeal
to the Fifth Circuit twice in order to challenge the status of New
Orleans's tax delinquency penalty (or "tax collection penalty") under the TIA. They lost in both cases, even though they garnered a
vigorous dissent in the former.185 Under the label test they would
have won, and the simplicity of the test would have ensured a
high measure of certainty on the matter.
In summary, this cuts through the mass of tests and factors,
which become irrelevant under the new approach. To borrow
Posner's memorable phrasing, courts can stop relying on precedent that forces them to ask "how close a 'family resemblance' the
exaction bears to an exaction acknowledged by all to be a 'tax.' Is
it a brother, or a third cousin?"186

2. States gain flexibility; taxpayers remain protected.
Functionally, the label test means that state and local governments can protect their revenue streams from federal injunctions by passing statutes with an appropriate label. This protection is consistent with the concerns of federalism and comity
outlined in Parts I and III.C.2. But one might worry that states
will abuse this function. States could label everything a tax, or
they could attempt to evade federal review of certain issues by
applying the labels to nontraditional categories, like a "tax" on
protest rallies. This sort of abuse would run up against state and
federal constitutional limitations and a well-developed literature
on "tax aversion"-the phenomenon of disproportionate voter resistance to paying charges labeled "taxes."
a) States and local governments gain flexibility. The label
test is an undeniable victory for states, and it provides an even
greater benefit to local governments. The bulk of state taxes may
185 See Washington I, 338 F3d at 445-48 (Duval dissenting); Washington II, 424 Fed
Appx at 312.
186 Empress Casino, 651 F3d at 728.
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already be protected under the TIA because the largest taxes,
such as income and use taxes, are already labeled as such.187 This
fact helps ensure that immediate adoption of the label test would
not be disruptive. But the label test does protect states' ability to
proactively decide to collect taxes free from federal-court interference, should the state government determine that is necessary in
particular instances.
The label test is of bigger aid to cities, counties, and other
local government entities, some of which may depend less on traditional "taxes."188 For instance, in Home Builders, the City of

Madison, Mississippi, charged a $700 "municipal impact fee" for
each dwelling constructed by developers.189 It used the money to
fund "essential municipal services and facilities in the rapidlygrowing city," including street improvements and police and fire
departments.190 Fortunately for the city, its case was before the
Fifth Circuit, but a stricter circuit court might have found that
the "impact fee" was indeed a "fee" because it was imposed on a
very narrow class of individuals (developers) in order to cope with
the cost of those individuals' activities (developing new residences). A federal injunction, especially when tied to longrunning litigation, could have crippled the expansion of Madison's
essential services, contrary to the legislative intentions of the
TIA. Under the label test, Madison would have the power to take
advantage of the TIA's protection by labeling its ordinance a tax.
b) Statutory labels are the only route sanctioned under
NFIB. The Supreme Court's decision in NFIB makes clear that
Congress could "describe something as a penalty but direct that it
nonetheless be treated as a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction
187 See, for example, House Fiscal Agency, State of Michigan Revenue: State Source
and Distribution*4 (Oct 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/9DF8-M7EV (containing a table that shows that in 2011-2012, Michigan received over 80 percent of its income from
sources already labeled "taxes," such as sales tax, income tax, tobacco tax, and business
taxes); Jeffrey L. Barnett, et al, 2012 Census of Governments: Finance-Stateand Local
Government Summary Report *7 (US Census Bureau, Dec 17, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/7HVR-CBQL (showing that taxes and intergovernmental transfers made
up more than 75 percent of state government revenues).
188 See, for example, Kent County Office of the Administrator, 2016 Adopted Budget
*22 (2016), archived at http://perma.cc/DQQ6-CDD3 (containing a chart showing that in
the fiscal year 2016, Kent County, Michigan, received only 33.5 percent of its revenue from
"taxes"). But see Barnett, et al, 2012 Census of Governments at *7 (cited in note 187) (showing that property and other taxes make up more than half of local government revenue).
At the very least, because there are so many more local government entities than state
governments, one would expect a large amount of variation.
189 Home Builders, 143 F3d at 1009.
190 Id.
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Act."191 The states, however, would have no such power to simply
designate when the TIA should apply. As the earlier discussion of
Tramel made clear, the TIA is still a federal statute. Therefore,
the federal government has the exclusive power to decide how
state law will affect the application of federal law. In NFIB, the
Supreme Court explicitly sanctioned "statutory text" as the
means by which to determine whether the law should apply. Since
Tramel, state labels have been seen as "relevant but not dispositive."192 Now, they are dispositive. State courts may continue to
determine whether charges are taxes for the purpose of state
law,19 but nothing in NFIB gives any reason to think that these
state-court decisions are of any consequence for determining what
is a "tax" under the TIA, just as Congress, and not federal courts,
determine which taxes ought to be protected by the AIA.
c) Anti-tax political sentiments restrainabuse. It is true
that, over time, state and local governments could use the label
test to narrow the charges that could be challenged before payment in federal court. The likelihood of state abuse is mitigated,
however, by the exception clause in the TIA itself and, perhaps
more importantly, the bad political optics of slapping the label
"tax" on everything.
First, it is worth noting that the Act itself is a policy decision
by Congress to stop federal courts from interfering with state
monetary collection. As the Senate report remarks, the TIA does
not "deprive [the taxpayer] of his day in court."194 The law blocks
federal intervention only before the taxes are collected. Furthermore, the law itself contains a safeguard exception under which
parties are blocked from federal court only "where a plain, speedy
and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State."195

This exception would take effect if citizens challenged the taxes
in state courts, and the state-court system mishandled or buried
their claims. In that case, litigants would again be able to turn to

191 NFIB, 567 US at 544.
192 Empress Casino, 651 F3d at 740 n 3 (Sykes dissenting). See also Hager, 84 F3d at
871; Kathrein, 636 F3d at 912 ("The statute or ordinance creating a charge may provide
evidence of its purpose, though the enacting government's characterization of a charge is
not determinative."); TrailerMarine, 977 F2d at 5 ("Puerto Rico's decision to call the fee a
'contribution' or 'premium' rather than a 'tax' may be pertinent but does not decide the
matter, for it is federal law that determines what constitutes a tax for this purpose.") (citation omitted); Robinson Protective, 581 F2d at 374.
193 See, for example, Tramel, 505 F2d at 1315 n 7.
194 S Rep No 75-1035 at 2 (cited in note 24).
195 28 USC § 1341.
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federal courts for an injunction against the collection of future
taxes, until the state sorted the claims out.
Furthermore, state and local governments will be restrained
from making everything a statutory "tax" because of the political
reality that citizens find taxes to be "more painful than other categories of expenses and losses."196 There is an "extensive literature" documenting this phenomenon, termed "tax aversion."197 In
one study, researchers conducted a survey in which they asked
participants about how they thought beneficiaries should pay for
certain services, such as education, mail delivery, or trash collection.198 In short, they found that "labels mattered."199 Subjects
rated tax payment schemes as less desirable than user fees, even
in situations in which "the economics were identical."200 Subjects
were especially affected by how payment schemes already were in
their jurisdictions, accepting taxes that were already being imposed on them, but preferring new fees to new taxes when no
taxes were in place.201 This "'no new taxes' bias," as the authors
nickname it,202 means that state and local governments would suffer political penalties not only for passing new penalties, but also
for relabeling fees as taxes by statute.
Not only that, but taxpayers may spend more time and money
on tax avoidance than pure economic rationality would predict.203
In another study, subjects stated that they were willing to travel
thirty minutes to a different jurisdiction to avoid 8 percent in
sales taxes at higher rates than those who would travel to get a 9
percent discount.204 The word "tax" simply has irrationally negative implications in the minds of citizens. This means that states
will change the label to "tax" only when the fiscal protection of the
TIA outweighs the political ramifications. These are exactly the
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Christopher C. Fennell and Lee Anne Fennell, Fear and Greed in Tax Policy: A

QualitativeResearchAgenda, 13 Wash U J L & Pol 75, 75-76 (2003).
197 See Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner, Toward a Pigouvian State, 164 U Pa L
Rev 93, 141 & n 197 (2015). See also Hayes R. Holderness, The Unexpected Role of Tax Salience in State Competition for Businesses, 84 U Chi L Rev 1091, 1126-27 & n 139 (2017).
198 Edward J. McCaffery and Jonathan Baron, Thinking about Tax, 12 Psychology,
Pub Pol & L 106, 117-18 (2006).
199 Id at 118.
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McCaffery and Baron, 12 Psychology, Pub Pol & L at 118 (cited in note 198).
Fennell and Fennell, 13 Wash U J L & Pol at 76 (cited in note 196).
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cases in which one might hope that state and local treasuries do
receive protection.
CONCLUSION

In terms of applying the Tax Injunction Act, the real benefit
of the NFIB label test accrues not to the states, but to federal
judges who have to apply the TIA and to litigants whose cases it
may affect. NFIB is clear in its statement that labels matter. Applying that decision to the TIA dramatically simplifies the test for
determining whether a government charge is a tax for purposes
of the act, and it also allows states to take advantage of the protection of the TIA by labeling charges as taxes in their statutes.
This construction of the TIA upholds the historical reasons for enacting the law-namely, "to limit drastically federal district court
jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local concern as the
collection of taxes."205 Any temptation a state may have to label
every charge a tax is fortunately counteracted by the political consequences of imposing "taxes," leaving the law in balance.

205 Rosewell, 450 US at 522.

